Abstract-Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving Strategyproof spectrum auction framework. We design two schemes based on PPS separately for 1) the single-unit auction model (SUA), where only single channel will be sold in the spectrum market; and 2) the multi-unit auction model (MUA), where the primary user subleases multi-unit channels to the secondary users and each of the secondary users wants to access multi-unit channels either. Since the social efficiency maximization problem is NP-hard in both auction models, we present allocation mechanisms with approximation factors of ð1 þ Þ and 32 separately for SUA and MUA, and further judiciously design strategyproof auction mechanisms with privacy preserving based on them. Our extensive evaluations show that our mechanisms achieve good social efficiency and with low computation and communication overhead.
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INTRODUCTION
T HE ever-increasing demand for limited radio spectrum resource poses a great challenge in spectrum allocation and usage [32] . Recent years, auction has been widely regarded as a preeminent way to tackle such a challenge because of its fairness and efficiency [19] . In general, bidders in spectrum auctions are the secondary users, while the auctioneer is a primary user in the single-sided spectrum auctions.
In recent years, many strategyproof auction mechanisms, in which bidding the true valuation is the dominant strategy of bidders, have been proposed for solving spectrum allocation issue. Unfortunately, the auctioneer is not always trustworthy. Once the true valuations of bidders are revealed to a corrupt auctioneer, he may abuse such information to improve his own advantage. Besides, the true valuation may divulge the profit of bidders, which is also a commercial secret for each bidder. Therefore, bid privacy preservation should be considered in spectrum auction design.
Allocating channels to the buyers who value them most will improve the social efficiency. However, it is not trivial to design a strategyproof spectrum auction mechanism with maximum social efficiency, due to its NP-hardness. There have been many studies devoted to maximizing the social efficiency while ensuring strategyproofness in spectrum auction mechanism design [8] , [10] , [32] , [38] , [40] . Only a few of these auction mechanisms address performance guarantee on social efficiency, e.g., [8] proposes a strategyproof combinatorial spectrum auction mechanism with an approximation factor of ffiffiffiffi ffi m p and [12] designs a set of 1 À 1=e approximation spectrum auction mechanisms with spatial and temporal reuse. However, none of them provides any guarantee on bid privacy preservation. To tackle this, [13] and [26] study the problem of designing privacypreserving or secure spectrum auction mechanisms with untrustworthy auctioneer. Unfortunately, neither of them provides any performance guarantee.
To maximize the social efficiency of spectrum auctions, we need to compute various bid sums of conflict-free bidders, and make decisions based on these bid sums. However, it is hard for the auctioneer or the bidders to compute these bid sums with privacy preserving since the auctioneer does not know any bidder's true bid value. Furthermore, since the computation burden for the auctioneer which relies on the bid values of bidders is too heavy, we cannot get a secure auction mechanism through simply combining the existing social-efficient auction mechanisms and some bid privacy preserving solutions directly. Thus, the task of designing a privacy preserving strategyproof spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee is highly challenging. We need to design some new mechanisms to provide good performance guarantee and protect the true bid values of bidders.
In this paper, we consider the issue of designing strategyproof spectrum auction mechanism which maximizes the social efficiency while protecting the bid privacy of bidders. We propose a Privacy Preserving Strategyproof spectrum auction framework (PPS). Under PPS, we mainly study two models:
The Single-Unit Auction model (SUA). The Multi-Unit Auction model (MUA). In the SUA model, the auction mechanism design only focuses on single channel trading. Multi-unit channels trading is supported in the case of MUA model. Since the maximization of social efficiency problem in both SUA and MUA are NP-hard, we design allocation mechanisms with approximation factors of (1 þ ) and 32 separately for the SUA and the MUA. We show that the proposed approximation allocation mechanisms are bid-monotone, and further design strategyproof auction mechanisms based on them, which are denoted as PPS-SUA and PPS-MUA respectively. As the PPS-MUA only ensures the worst case performance, we further propose an improved mechanism, denoted by PPS-EMUA, to improve the social efficiency of PPS-MUA. We also show that PPS-EMUA is strategyproof and privacy-preserving.
It is not a trivial job to protect privacy of the true bid values of bidders in the auction mechanisms as auction relies on these bid values to make decision on allocation and payment computation. To address this challenge, we will first introduce an agent, which is a semi-trusted third party (such as FCC), different from auctioneer. The agent, together with the auctioneer, will execute the auction in PPS. In our design, bidders apply Paillier's homomorphic encryption (HE) to encrypt the bids so agent can perform computation on the ciphertexts, agent then sends the results by adding random numbers and shuffling bidder IDs to auctioneer for making allocation decision, which provides privacy protection without affecting the correctness of the allocation. We will prove that neither the agent nor the auctioneer can infer any true bid value about the bidders without collusion. To the best of our knowledge, PPS is the first privacy preserving spectrum auction scheme that maximizes the social efficiency. Note that we did not focus on protecting the location privacy of bidders in our mechanisms, as previous schemes (e.g., [22] ) can be integrated into our mechanisms.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the spectrum auction and present the framework of PPS. Section 3 proposes a strategyproof spectrum auction mechanism for solving the single-unit auction model. Section 4 further extends the auction model with consideration of multiple-items trading model. Extensive simulation results are evaluated in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the related literatures and Section 7 concludes the paper.
PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first formulate our spectrum auction model, and state the design targets of our work. Then, we overview the cryptographic tools used in this paper. At last, we will introduce the PPS, which is a privacy preserving spectrum auction framework.
Spectrum Auction Model
We model the procedure of secure spectrum allocation as a sealed-bid auction, in which there is an auctioneer (a.k.a. primary user), a set of bidders (a.k.a. secondary users) and an agent. In each round of the auction, the auctioneer subleases the access right of m channels to n bidders. The bidders first encrypt their bids by using the encryption key of a homomorphic encryption scheme (e.g., Paillier's scheme) for the auctioneer, and submit the encrypted bids to the agent (not the auctioneer). Here, EðmÞ denotes the homomorphic encryption of message m. Then, the auctioneer and the agent allocate the channels to the bidders via communicating with each other. We assume that the agent is a semi-trusted party, and will not collude with the auctioneer.
We use C ¼ fc 1 ; . . . ; c m g to denote the set of channels, and B ¼ f1; . . . ; ng to denote the set of bidders. Each bidder i 2 B is described as i ¼ fL i ; N i ; b i ; v i ; p i g, where L i is the geographical location of i, N i is the number of channels that bidder i wants to buy, b i , v i and p i separately denote the bid value, true valuation and payment of i for all the channels that he wants to buy. We assume that the interference radii of all channels are the same, which are equal to 1 2 unit. Then, two bidders i and j conflict with each other if the distance between L i and L j is smaller than 1 unit. Bidders can share one channel iff they are conflict free with each other.
In this paper, we study two spectrum auction models. The first one is that there is only one channel in the spectrum market, then m ¼ 1 and N i ¼ 1 for each bidder. We call this model the Single-Unit Auction Model. The second one is the multi-unit auction model which supports multiple channels trading in the market. In MUA, each bidder wants to access N i ! 1 channels rather than part of them.
Design Targets
Our work is to design social efficient strategyproof spectrum auction mechanisms with bid privacy preservation. First, we will allocate channels to the bidders who value them most to maximize the social efficiency. However, the optimal channel allocation problem in SUA and MUA are all NP-hard. Thus, we will design approximation mechanisms instead. Second, our auction mechanisms should be strategyproof, which means bidding truthfully is the dominant strategy for any bidders. To achieve this, it is sufficient to show that our allocation mechanism is bid-monotone, and always charges each winner its critical value [25] . We say an allocation mechanism is bid-monotone if bidder i wins the auction by bidding b i , he will always win by bidding b 0 i > b i . And the critical value of each bidder i in a bid-monotone allocation mechanism is the minimum bid that bidder i will win in the auction. The third objective is to protect the privacy of the bid values of bidders. To achieve privacy protection, we will apply homomorphic encryption to encrypt the bid values using the public key of auctioneer, and agent will perform the most of the computation and send the intermediate results to the auctioneer. We will show that both the auctioneer and the agent cannot get any information about the true bid values of bidders as long as they will not collude with each other.
Cryptographic Primitives
In this part, we will introduce the cryptographic tools used in this paper: Paillier's cryptosystem and homomorphic encryption.
Paillier's cryptosystem. An entity first randomly chooses two large prime numbers h 1 and h 2 . Then, he computes where LðaÞ ¼ ða À 1Þ=h mod h. Homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption which allows addition and multiplication to be carried out on ciphertext, and obtain a correct encrypted result.
The Paillier's cryptosystem satisfies the following homomorphic operation:
Note that the random integer r 0 dose not contribute to decryption or other homomorphic operation, hence we use EðmsgÞ instead of Eðmsg; r 0 Þ in the remaining paper. Indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA). Ciphertext indistinguishability plays an important role in cryptosystems. Intuitively, if a cryptosystem possesses the property of indistinguishability, then an adversary will not be able to distinguish from a pair of ciphertexts via the messages they encrypt. Commonly, the property of indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack is defined by the following game:
1. A adversary is given a public key, which it may use to perform a polynomially bounded number of encryptions or other operations. 2. The adversary generates two equal-length messages msg 1 and msg 2 , and transmits them to a challenge oracle along with the public key. 3. The challenge oracle selects one of the messages uniformly at random, encrypts the message under the public key, and returns the resulting ciphertext to the adversary. We say an underlying cryptosystem is IND-CPA if the probabilistic polynomial time-bounded adversary cannot determine which of the two messages was chosen by the oracle, with probability significantly greater than 1 2 (the success rate of random guessing).
A Spectrum Auction Framework with Privacy Preserving
The process of our spectrum auction mechanisms consists of three steps: bidding, allocation and payment calculation. To protect the bid values of bidders, we design a strategyproof spectrum auction framework with privacy preserving, namely PPS, which is shown in Algorithm 1.
A SINGLE-UNIT SCHEME
In this section, we will present a strategyproof spectrum auction mechanism for SUA, denoted by PPS-SUA, which maximizes the social efficiency and preserves the bid privacy.
Initialization and Bidding
Before running the auction, the auctioneer generates an encryption key EK and a decryption key DK of Paillier's cryptosystem. Then, he announces EK as the public key, and keeps DK in private. Each bidder i encrypts his bid b i by using EK, and sends ðEðb i Þ; L i Þ to the agent. In the sending procedure, each bidder keeps his encrypted bidding price as a secret to the auctioneer.
Allocation Mechanism with Privacy Preserving
After receiving the encrypted bids from bidders, the auctioneer and the agent allocate channels to bidders via communicating with each other. The goal of our allocation mechanism is to maximize the social efficiency, which is equal to finding a group of conflict-free bidders with highest bid sum. Define the bid value of each bidder as his weight. Our optimal allocation problem can be easily reduced to the maximum weighted independent set (MWIS) problem, which is a well-known NP-hard problem. To tackle this NP-hardness, we propose a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) based on shifting strategy [14] , [23] , which provides an approximation factor of (1 þ ). For completeness of presentation, we first review this PTAS method.
In the PTAS, we first select a positive integer k, then, the plane is subdivided into several grids of size at k Ã k by a collection of vertical lines x ¼ i Á k þ r and horizontal lines y ¼ j Á k þ s, where 0 r; s k À 1. We call such a subdivision as (r; s)-shifting. Here we assume that the conflict radius of each bidder is 1 2 , then each bidder can be viewed as a unit disk. Fig. 1 gives an instance of a grid subdivided by ðr; sÞ-shifting, where k ¼ 4. We will throw away all the disks which intersect with some special lines X r k and Y s k in (r; s)-shifting, and solve the sub-instances of disks contained in each grid individually. Here, a grid is a square defined by fðx; yÞ j r þ ik x r þ ði þ 1Þk; s þ jk y s þ ðj þ 1Þkg for some integers i and j. Let the optimal solution of ðr; sÞ-shifting be the union sets of all the optimal solution of the subdivided grids, and wðOPT ðr; sÞÞ be the weight of the optimal solution of ðr; sÞ-shifting. It can be proven that there is at least one ðr; sÞ-shifting, 0 r; s k À 1, with
where OPT ðBÞ is the maximum weighted independent set of all the bidders, and wðOPT ðBÞÞ is the weight of OPT ðBÞ. For any given integer k ! 1, there are k 2 kinds of different shiftings in total. We will choose the optimal solution of ðr; sÞ-shifting's that with the highest weight as our final approximation solution. Thus, we have a PTAS for optimal channel allocation problem, i.e., setting k ¼ 1þþ ffiffiffiffiffiffi 1þ p . Based on this PTAS we then present our channel allocation mechanism with privacy preserving. Observe that the bidders submit their bids to agent encrypted using the auctioneer's public key. Following the PTAS protocol, we need to compute a maximum weighted independent set for each grid in the ðr; sÞ-shifting, i.e., compare the weights of all independent sets. Clearly, the auctioneer should not access the encrypted bid of any bidder as he has the decryption key. In our protocol, the agent will compute Eð P i2S b i Þ for each of the maximal independent set contained in a grid, which can be done easily as Eðb i Þ is computed from homomorphic encryption. For any given grid g 
By sending the intermediate results to the auctioneer, the auctioneer can compare and find which independent set will be chosen for each subgrid. Observe that both the auctioneer and the agent will not know the bid values in the independent set. By using the optimal solution of each grid, the agent can calculate the encrypted value EðwðOPT ðr; sÞÞÞ, and allocate channels to bidders without leaking the true bid values of bidders. The allocation will be sent to the auctioneer. The details are described in Algorithm 3. Lemma 1. Our allocation mechanism for SUA is bid-monotone.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the bidder i wins by bidding b i in grid g r;s j . Then, s 1 ð1Þ ¼ r, s 2 ð1Þ ¼ s and
thermore, the increased weight of other shiftings is no more than ðr; sÞ-shifting when i increases his bid, which indicates that s 1 ð1Þ ¼ r and s 2 ð1Þ ¼ s still hold. Thus, we can conclude that i will always win by bidding b
Payment Calculation with Privacy Preserving
We have proved that our allocation mechanism is bidmonotone, which indicates that there exists a critical value for each bidder. The bidder i will win the auction by bidding a price which is higher than its critical value, otherwise, bidder i will lose in the auction. To ensure the strategyproofness of our auction mechanism, we will compute the critical value for each winner as the final payment in the following.
Without loss of generality, we also assume that the bidder i wins by bidding b i in grid g r;s j . We further assume that d r;s lðiÞ;j is the maximum independent set with highest weight which does not include bidder i, and OPT ðs 1 ðfðiÞÞ; s 2 ðfðiÞÞÞ is the optimal solution of ðs 1 ðfðiÞÞ; s 2 ðfðiÞÞÞ-shifting which has the highest weight and does not include the bidder i. We will calculate the critical value of the winner i based on the following considerations.
The minimum bid price, denoted as p 1 i , ensures bidder i win in grid g r;s j . Then, we can get that
The minimum bid of bidder i which makes OPT ðr; sÞ always with the highest weight among all the optimal solutions of shiftings including bidder i. We use p In conclusion, the critical value of bidder i is p i ¼ maxfp 
It is easy to prove the following theorems.
Theorem 2. PPS-SUA charges each winner its critical value and is strategyproof.
Theorem 3. The computation and communication cost of PPS-SUA are all Oðn k 2 þ1 Þ.
Privacy Analysis of PPS-SUA
Theorem 4. PPS-SUA is bid privacy-preserving.
Proof. To confirm the bid privacy, we consider the view of agent and auctioneer, respectively. During our auction mechanism for SUA, the agent can obtain nothing but the encrypted bids and the sorting results of the weight of each grid and each shifting. Based on the IND-CPA security of homomorphic cryptosystem, the agent cannot learn more information about the bid of any bidder.
The auctioneer holds the decryption key. Nevertheless, he has no direct access to the encrypted bids. While computing the optimal allocation and critical value of winner i, the auctioneer can receive the encrypted weight of maximal independent sets in each grid, weight of the optimal solution of each shifting, and fp 
A MULTI-UNIT SCHEME
In this section, we propose a strategyproof auction mechanism for MUA, namely PPS-MUA, which protects the bid privacy of bidders and provides an approximation factor of 32. Then, we further design an extended version of PPS-MUA, namely PPS-EMUA, to improve the average performance of PPS-MUA, while keeping other properties unchanged. Although PPS-EMUA outperforms PPS-MUA, thoroughly introducing PPS-MUA can help us to better understand the mechanism of PPS-EMUA, and to better analyze the key properties of PPS-EMUA. Thus, we will introduce PPS-MUA first in the following.
Initialization and Bidding
The initialization and bidding procedure in MUA is similar as that in SUA, which can be referred in Section 3.1. At last, each bidder i encrypts his bid b i by using the encryption key of the auctioneer, and only sends ðEðb i Þ; N i ; L i Þ to the agent.
Allocation Mechanism with Privacy Preserving
We have proved that the allocation problem which maximizes the social efficiency in SUA is an NP-hard problem. Since SUA is a special case of MUA, the optimal allocation issue in MUA is also NP-hard. Thus, we will introduce a simple allocation mechanism which approximates the social efficiency. We first subdivide the plane into grids at size 2 Ã 2, and use the symbol g l to denote the lth 2 Ã 2 grid. It is obvious that there are four 1 Ã 1 grids in each g l . These four 1 Ã 1 grids can be categorized into four types as shown in Fig. 2a . Let g l r be the 1 Ã 1 grid in g l with type r, g r be the set of 1 Ã 1 grids with type r. We also assume that the conflict radius of each bidder is 
Note that we cannot get the optimal solution in each grid g can be reduced to a knapsack problem (KP), where the bid value of bidders is the value of items in KP, the number of channels in the market and channel demand of each bidder is the total volume of the knapsack and the volume of each item respectively. Although the KP is an NP-hard problem, there exists a PTAS [20] , and a greedy allocation mechanism with approximation factor of 2 (the details can be referred to lines 3-5 in Algorithm 4). It is hard to design a privacy preserving version of the PTAS based on dynamic programming, thus, we design our allocation mechanism for MUA based on the greedy allocation mechanism in each sub-grid g Theorem 5. Our auction mechanism for MUA has an approximation factor of 32.
Proof. Assume that OPT ðBÞ is the optimal solution of our original allocation problem, and OPT r ðBÞ ¼ fiji 2 OPT ðBÞ and i is allocated in g r g. Then, we can get that wðOPT ðBÞÞ ¼ 
where wðÁÞ is an operation to compute the weight of solutions. For each grid g l r , we can get that
Since we sort bidders in non-increasing order according to their per-unit bidding prices, so user i has the ith largest value in 
Because we choose the APP ðg 
In a similar way, we can get that OPT ðBÞ 4 maxðOPT ðg r ÞÞ 1 r 4 32APP ðBÞ:
In the following, we will show the privacy preserving version of our channel allocation mechanism for MUA in Algorithm 5. To protect the bid privacy of bidders, the agent confuses the ID of bidders by using a permutation p : Z n ! Z n , and masks the encrypted bids by using two random values d which buyers should win the auction via communicating with the auctioneer with bid privacy preserving. Lemma 6. Our allocation mechanism for MUA is bid-monotone. 
Payment Calculation with Privacy Preserving
After allocating channels to the bidders in our allocation mechanism, we need to compute a critical value for each winner as their payment. We now consider the procedure of payment calculation for a winner i which is located in grid g l r;s .
Since the bidder i wins the auction, we can conclude that: 
The critical value of bidder i is p i ¼ maxðp
Next we will show that we can compute the critical value for each winner without leaking the true bid value of bidders.
Since the agent can compute Eðd 
homomorphic operations, and sends them to the auctioneer. Then, the auctioneer decrypts these ciphertexts, sets
to the agent. After computing the payment p i of each winner i, the agent sends them to the auctioneer.
From above analysis, we can conclude that:
Theorem 7. We charge each winner its critical value in PPS-MUA. PPS-MUA is strategyproofness.
Extended Auction Mechanism for MUA
We have designed a simple allocation mechanism for MUA, which provides an approximation factor of 32. However, PPS-MUA only chooses the solution of a 1 2 Ã 1 2 sub-grid as the final solution of a 2 Ã 2 grid, while dropping all the other bidders that located in other 15 sub-grids. Although the allocation in this way provides a guarantee for the worst case performance, the average performance may be relatively low. To address this issue, we extend our allocation mechanism by supplementing the solution with other bidders as shown in Algorithm 7.
Lemma 8. The allocation mechanism PPS-EMUA presented in
Algorithm 7 is bid-monotone.
Proof. Since we have proved that if the winner i increases his bid in Algorithm 4, he will always win the auction.
Here, we only need to concentrate on the winners that lose in Algorithm 4, but will win in the extended version. Suppose such a winner i increases his bid to b 0 i which satisfies b 0 i > b i , there are two possible cases: 1) i wins in Algorithm 4 and 2) i remains lose in Algorithm 4. In the case that i loses in Algorithm 4, the final allocation of Algorithm 4 is the same as the allocation when i bids b i . Thus, there is no new bidder whose bidding price is higher than i in the sorted loser list of Algorithm 7 after the bidder i increasing his bid. In addition to i wins by bidding b i , we can conclude that the bidder i will also win the auction when he increases his bid. t u
As this new allocation mechanism is bid-monotone, there exists a critical value for each winner. We use p As the extended allocation mechanism is bid-monotone and we always charge each winner its critical value, we have Theorem 9. PPS-EMUA is strategyproof and social efficient.
In the following, we will show that PPS-EMUA can be performed with privacy preserving. Algorithm 8 shows the allocation mechanism of PPS-EMUA with bid privacy.
The procedure of payment calculation has four steps: 1) We can obtain p 
Privacy Analysis
Theorem 11. PPS-MUA and PPS-EMUA are privacy-preserving for each bidder.
Proof. Here we only prove it for PPS-EMUA as PPS-MUA is a procedure of PPS-EMUA. We first consider the agent. Except the encrypted bids, the agent can only obtain some orders, such as the bidding price of the bidders in each sub-grid, during our auction mechanism of PPS-EMUA. In the process of payment calculation, the agent can get nothing but the auction outcomes and some new orders. Based on the IND-CPA security of homomorphic cryptosystem, the agent cannot learn more information about the bid of any bidder. Although the auctioneer holds the decryption key, he has no direct access to the encrypted bids. While computing the allocation in each sub-grid g l r;s , the auctioneer can built jg l r;s j þ 1 functions that with jg l r;s j bids and two random numbers, where jg l r;s j is the number of bidders that located in g l r;s . Since the number of variables is larger than the number of functions, the auctioneer cannot decrypt any true bid value of bidders. In the other parts of our auction mechanism, the auctioneer only receives the weight of solutions. Since the auctioneer has no idea about which bidders are in these solutions, he can also get nothing from them. t u
PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
Simulation Setup
In our simulations, the number of bidders varies from 50 to 300, and all the bidders are randomly distributed in a square area. The bidding price of each bidder is uniformly generated in ½0;100. We use a 1;024-bit length Pailliers homomorphic encryption system in the simulation. Thus, we choose g 1 ¼ 1;007 and g 2 ¼ 1;022 to ensure the correctness of modular operations. For multi-unit auction, we assume the channel demand of each bidder is randomly generated from 1 to 4, and there are four or eight available channels in spectrum market. We mainly study the social efficiency ratio, computation overhead and the communication overhead in our simulations. We define the social efficiency ratio is the ratio between the social efficiency of our approximation mechanism and the optimal one. Since agent and auctioneer are two central party in this paper, we evaluate the computation overhead of them in our design by recording the required processing time, and evaluate the communication overhead through calculating the size of essential information transferred in the auction. All the simulations are performed over 100 runs and the result is the averaged value.
Performance of the PPS
In this section, we mainly focus on the performance of social efficiency ratio, auction computation overhead, and communication overhead under different simulation settings.
We first study the social efficiency ratio of our mechanisms under SUA model and MUA model respectively. From  Figs. 3a and 4a , obviously, the social efficiency ratio decreases when the number of bidders increases. This is because the increasing number of bidders will incur a more fierce degree of competition. Therefore, the social efficiency ratio decreases slightly with the increasing number of bidders in both auction models. Fig. 3a also shows that the social efficiency ratio increases when k increases, where k is the size of a subdivided grid. From the theoretical analysis, we can learn that when k increases, less unit-disk defined by bidders' requests are thrown away by using the shifting method. Thus, the social efficiency ratio increases with the increase of parameter k. Of course, the performances of our proposed PPS-SUA is always better than the theoretical bound in performance analysis.Specifically, Fig. 4a examines the social efficiency ratio achieved by PPS-MUA and extended version of PPS-MUA (a.k.a PPS-EMUA). We can observe that the ratio of PPS-EMUA performs much better than PPS-MUA when the available channels in spectrum market is fixed to 4. We can also observe that the PPS-EMUA greatly improves the performance in Fig. 4a . This is because the PPS-EMUA adopts a greedy-like allocation mechanism to allocate channels to the potential bidders who lose in PPS-MUA.
Then we study the computation overhead of the proposed mechanisms that were depicted in Figs. 3b and 4b. It is obvious that the computation overhead of the agent change greatly as the number of bidders and k in PPS-SUA. We can also find that the computation overhead of the agent is increased with the number of bidders, and affected by the changing of the number of channels slightly in Fig. 4b .
Similar to the agent computation overhead, Figs. 3c and 4c plot computation overhead of the auctioneer. We find that the cost time of auctioneer is much larger than that of the agent, this is because that the decryption operation cost much more time than the homomorphic operations and auctioneer is responsible for all the decryption operations. Tables 1 and 2 show the overall communication overhead induced under SUA and MUA respectively. We can easily get that the communication overhead is increased with the increment of number of bidders and k in Table 1 . In Table 2 , the total number of channels also plays an important role in the cost of communication overhead. Anyway, the overheads of the proposed PPS mechanism are appropriate to be applied in real auction systems.
6 LITERATURE REVIEWS
Spectrum Auction
Auctions have been widely used in the scope of dynamic spectrum allocation. Large amount of studies are proposed aiming at designing economical robust spectrum auction mechanisms (e.g., [2] , [7] , [8] , [10] , [12] , [28] , [29] , [30] , [32] , [34] , [37] , [38] , [39] , [40] , [41] ). One line of work on spectrum auction is based on studying auction with spectrum spatial reuse, e.g., [11] , [15] , [29] , [30] , [31] , [38] and etc. The basic idea is that the spectrum can be reused by s set of conflictfree winning buyers. However, a number of recent studies have shown that the spectrum utilization varies dramatically, both in the spatial and temporal domains [36] . The above studies do not consider the temporal demands from buyers, where each buyer may only require a channel within a certain period of time and different buyers may have different time periods. Thus, another line is based on spectrum temporal reuse, e.g., [8] , [28] . These studies ignore spatial reuse by assuming that the conflict graph amongst buyers geometry locations is a completed graph for each channel.
Each of these approaches has its own optimization goal. For instance, [8] , [10] , [32] , [38] , [40] focus on maximizing the social efficiency while ensuring strategyproofness in an auction design, and [2] , [15] aim at achieving the optimal revenue for the primary user. Moreover, most above auction mechanisms were designed to achieve strategyproofness, without considering performance guarantee.
In [7] , [28] , [33] , [34] , the authors consider the strategyproof online spectrum auction or allocation design. Wu and Vaidya [30] and Xu et al. [32] , [34] proposed spectrum auction mechanisms for multi-channel wireless networks. Wang et al. [29] and Zhou and Zheng [39] solve the spectrum allocation in a double auction framework. Unfortunately, none of the above studies addresses the privacy preserving issue in the auction design.
Privacy Preserving Spectrum Auction
Privacy preserving, one of the critical human factors, has gained increasing attentions recently. Many privacy preserving mechanisms have been proposed in mechanism design [5] , [16] , [18] , [21] , [27] . Recent years, many research efforts begin to focus on privacy preserving study in auction design, e.g., [3] , [4] , [24] . Brandt and Sandholm [3] studied unconditional full privacy in the sealed-bid auctions. Naor et al. [24] proposed an architecture for auction mechanism design with the goal of preserving the privacy of the inputs of the participants while maintaining communication and computational efficiency. However, these methods cannot be directly applied in spectrum auction design due to various reasons (such as spectrum spatial reuse, computationally complexity).
Huang et al. [13] first proposed a strategyproof spectrum auction with consideration of privacy preserving, and Pan et al. [26] provided a secure spectrum auction to prevent the frauds of the insincere auctioneer. Unfortunately, none of the existing solutions with privacy preserving provides any performance guarantee, such as maximizing the social efficiency which is often NP-hard. Designing a strategyproof auction mechanism with provable performance guarantee is a harder problem, particularly if we want to support privacy preservation. Our mechanisms rely on privacy preserving comparison and polynomial evaluations [17] , which is extensively studied topic in secure multi-party computation [1] , [6] , [9] , [35] .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focused on designing strategyproof auction mechanisms which maximize the social efficiency without leaking any true bid value of bidders, and proposed a framework of PPS for solving this issue. We designed privacy-preserving strategyproof auction mechanisms with approximation factors of ð1 þ Þ and 32 separately for SUA and MUA. Our evaluation results demonstrated that both PPS-SUA and PPS-EMUA achieve good performance on social efficiency, while inducing only a small amount of computation and communication overhead. A future work is to design robust privacy-preserving strategyproof auction mechanisms without inexplicitly requiring the location of bidders. Another future work is to design privacy-preserving auction mechanisms by removing the dependency of third-party agent.
